### 2NC OV vs. Policy Affs

#### The affirmative is blocking the transition away from capitalism in the status quo by enabling class exploitation.

#### This has a few impacts

#### A. The logic of capitalism results in extinction through the creation of ecological catastrophe and violent imperialist wars that will turn nuclear. That’s our Foster 5 evidence.

#### B. It turns the aff

<Insert turns the aff card>

#### C. The K is a prerequisite to the aff - the aff’s concern with solving fleeting crises makes error replication inevitable - this conjunctural crises are inevitably recurring features of the fundamental structural crisis of capital.

Meszaros 6 (Istvan, “Structural Crisis of Politics,” *Monthly Review,* September, Proquest, Accessed 7-11-09, PAK)

In this respect it is necessary to clarify the relevant differences between types or modalities of crisis. It is not a matter of indifference whether a crisis in the social sphere can be considered a periodic/con-junctural crisis, or something much more fundamental than that. For, obviously, the way of dealing with a fundamental crisis cannot be con-ceptualized in terms of the the categories of periodic or conjunctural crises. To anticipate a main point of this lecture, as far as politics is con-cerned the crucial difference between the two sharply contrasting types of crises in question is that the periodic or conjunctural crises unfold and are more or less successfully resolved within a given framework of politics, whereas the fundamental crisis affects that framework itself in its entirety. In other words, in relation to a given socioeconomic and political system we are talking about the vital difference between the more or less frequent crises in politics, as against the crisis of the estab-lished modality of politics itself, with qualitatively different require-ments for its possible solution. It is the latter that we are concerned with today. In general terms, this distinction is not simply a question of the apparent severity of the contrasting types of crises. For a periodic or conjunctural crisis can be dramatically severe—as the “Great World Economic Crisis of 1929–1933” happened to be—yet capable of a solution within the parameters of the given system. Misinterpreting the severity of a given conjunctural crisis as if it was a fundamental systemic crisis, as Stalin and his advisers did in the midst of the “Great World Economic Crisis of 1929–1933,” is bound to lead to mistaken and indeed volun-taristic strategies, like declaring social democracy to be the “main enemy” in the early 1930s, which could only strengthen, as in fact it trag-ically did strengthen, Hitler’s forces. And in the same way, but in the opposite sense, the “non-explosive” character of a prolonged structural crisis, in contrast to the “thunderstorms” (Marx) through which peri-odic conjunctural crises can discharge and resolve themselves, may also lead to fundamentally misconceived strategies, as a result of the misin-terpretation of the absence of “thunderstorms” as if their absence was the overwhelming evidence for the indefinite stability of “organized capitalism” and of the “integration of the working class.” This kind of misinterpretation, to be sure heavily promoted by the ruling ideological interests under the pretenses of “scientific objectivity,” tends to rein-force the position of those who represent the self-justifying acceptance of the reformist accommodationist approaches in institutionalized—for-merly genuinely oppositional—working–class parties and trade unions (now, however, “Her Majesty’s Official Opposition,” as the saying goes). But even among the deeply committed critics of the capital system, the same misconception regarding the indefinitely crisis-free perspective of the established order can result in the adoption of a self-paralyzing defensive posture, as we witnessed in the socialist movement in the last few decades. It cannot be stressed enough, the crisis of politics in our time is not intelligible without being referred to the broad overall social framework of which politics is an integral part. This means that in order to clarify the nature of the persistent and deepening crisis of politics all over the world today we must focus attention on the crisis of the capital system itself. For the crisis of capital we are experiencing—at least since very beginning of the 1970s—is an all-embracing structural crisis.18 Let us see, summed up as briefly as possible, the defining character istics of the structural crisis we are concerned with. The historical novelty of today’s crisis is manifest under four main aspects: ♦ (1) its character is universal, rather than restricted to one particular sphere (e.g., financial, or commercial, or affecting this or that particu-lar branch of production, or applying to this rather than that type of labour, with its specific range of skills and degrees of productivity, etc.); ♦ (2) its scope is truly global (in the most threateningly literal sense of the term), rather than confined to a particular set of countries (as all major crises have been in the past); ♦ (3) its time scale is extended, continuous—if you like: permanent— rather than limited and cyclic, as all former crises of capital happened to be. ♦ (4) its mode of unfolding might be called creeping—in contrast to the more spectacular and dramatic eruptions and collapses of the past— while adding the proviso that even the most vehement or violent con-vulsions cannot be excluded as far as the future is concerned: i.e, when the complex machinery now actively engaged in “crisis-management” and in the more or less temporary “displacement” of the growing con-tradictions runs out of steam.... [Here] it is necessary to make some general points about the criteria of a structural crisis, as well as about the forms in which its solution may be envisaged. To put it in the simplest and most general terms, a structural crisis affects the totality of a social complex, in all its relations with its con-stituent parts or sub-complexes, as well as with other complexes to which it is linked. By contrast, a non-structural crisis affects only some parts of the complex in question, and thus no matter how severe it might be with regard to the affected parts, it cannot endanger the continued survival of the overall structure. Accordingly, the displacement of contradictions is feasible only while the crisis is partial, relative and internally manageable by the system, requiring no more than shifts—even if major ones—within the relatively autonomous system itself. By the same token, a structural crisis calls into question the very existence of the overall complex concerned, postulat-ing its transcendence and replacement by some alternative complex. The same contrast may be expressed in terms of the limits any particular social complex happens to have in its immediacy, at any given time, as compared to those beyond which it cannot conceivably go. Thus, a structural crisis is not concerned with the immediate limits but with the ultimate limits of a global structure....19  Thus, in a fairly obvious sense nothing could be more serious than the structural crisis of capital’s mode of social metabolic reproduction which defines the ultimate limits of the established order. But even though profoundly serious in its all-important general parameters, on the face of it the structural crisis may not appear to be of such a decid-ing importance when compared to the dramatic vicissitudes of a major conjunctural crisis. For the “thunderstorms” through which the con-junctural crises discharge themselves are rather paradoxical in the sense that in their mode of unfolding they not only discharge (and impose) but also resolve themselves, to the degree to which that is feasible under the circumstances. This they can do precisely because of their partial char-acter which does not call into question the ultimate limits of the estab-lished global structure. At the same time, however, and for the same reason, they can only “resolve” the underlying deep-seated structural problems—which necessarily assert themselves again and again in the form of the specific conjunctural crises—in a strictly partial and tempo-rally also most limited way. Until, that is, the next conjunctural crisis appears on society’s horizon. By contrast, in view of the inescapably complex and prolonged nature of the structural crisis, unfolding in historical time in an epochal and not episodic/instantaneous sense, it is the cumulative interrelationship of the whole that decides the issue, even under the false appearance of “normality.” This is because in the structural crisis everything is at stake, involving the all-embracing ultimate limits of the given order of which there cannot possibly be a “symbolic/paradigmatic” particular instance. Without understanding the overall systemic connections and implications of the particular events and developments we lose sight of the really significant changes and of the corresponding levers of poten-tial strategic intervention positively to affect them, in the interest of the necessary systemic transformation. Our social responsibility therefore calls for an uncompromising critical awareness of the emerging cumula-tive interrelationship, instead of looking for comforting reassurances in the world of illusory normality until the house collapses over our head.

### A2: Perm – Do Both (Policy Aff)

#### The perm is worse than the plan – it validates the ability of capitalism to fix its own problems which short circuits any attempt at a more radical form of politics

Meszaros 95 [Istavan, Prof. Emeritus at Sussex, Beyond Capital: Towards a Theory of Transition] p. 930

THE difficulty is that the ‘moment’ of radical politics is strictly limited by the nature of the crises in question and the temporal determinations of their unfolding. The breach opened up at times of crisis cannot be left open forever and the measures adopted to fill it, from the earliest steps onwards, have their own logic and cumulative impact on subsequent interventions. Furthermore, both the existing socioeconomic structures and their corresponding framework of political institutions tend to act against radical initiatives by their very inertia as soon as the worst moment of the crisis is over and thus it becomes possible to contemplate again ‘the line of least resistance’. And no one can consider ‘radical restructuring’ the line of least resistance, since by its very nature it necessarily involves upheaval and the disconcerting prospect of the unknown. No immediate economic achievement can offer a way out of this dilemma so as to prolong the life-span of revolutionary politics, since such limited economic achievements made within the confines of the old premises — act in the opposite direction by relieving the most pressing crisis symptoms and, as a result, reinforcing the old reproductive mechanism shaken by the crisis. As history amply testifies, at the first sign of ‘recovery’, politics is pushed back Into its traditional role of helping to sustain and enforce the given socio-economic determinations. The claimed ‘recovery’ itself reached on the basis of the ‘well tried economic motivations’, acts as the self-evident ideological justification for reverting to the subservient, routine role of politics, in harmony with the dominant institutional framework. Thus, radical politics can only accelerate its own demise (and thereby shorten, instead of extending as it should, the favourable ‘moment’ of major political intervention) if it consents to define its own scope in terms of limited economic targets which are in fact necessarily dictated by the established socioeconomic structure in crisis

#### The permutation is severance – it severs out of the methodology of capitalism rooted in the 1AC. This a voting issue because it creates a moving target that steals neg ground a makes it impossible to debate.

#### You cannot permute a method – it strips out all of the conceptual theory that allows us both understand the world and to create a praxis to end oppression

Tumino 1 [Stephen, Prof English at Pitt, ““What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critique, p. online]

Orthodox Marxism has become a test-case of the "radical" today. Yet, what passes for orthodoxy on the left—whether like Smith and Zizek they claim to support it, or, like Butler and Rorty they want to "achieve our country" by excluding it from "U.S. Intellectual life" ("On Left Conservatism"), is a parody of orthodoxy which hybridizes its central concepts and renders them into flexodox simulations. Yet, even in its very textuality, however, the orthodox is a resistance to the flexodox. Contrary to the common-sensical view of "orthodox" as "traditional" or "conformist" "opinions," is its other meaning: ortho-doxy not as flexodox "hybridity," but as "original" "ideas." "Original," not in the sense of epistemic "event," "authorial" originality and so forth, but, as in chemistry, in its opposition to "para," "meta," "post" and other ludic hybridities: thus "ortho" as resistance to the annotations that mystify the original ideas of Marxism and hybridize it for the "special interests" of various groups. The "original" ideas of Marxism are inseparable from their effect as "demystification" of ideology—for example the deployment of "class" that allows a demystification of daily life from the haze of consumption. Class is thus an "original idea" of Marxism in the sense that it cuts through the hype of cultural agency under capitalism and reveals how culture and consumption are tied to labor, the everyday determined by the workday: how the amount of time workers spend engaging in surplus-labor determines the amount of time they get for reproducing and cultivating their needs. Without changing this division of labor social change is impossible. Orthodoxy is a rejection of the ideological annotations: hence, on the one hand, the resistance to orthodoxy as "rigid" and "dogmatic" "determinism," and, on the other, its hybridization by the flexodox as the result of which it has become almost impossible today to read the original ideas of Marxism, such as "exploitation"; "surplus-value"; "class"; "class antagonism"; "class struggle"; "revolution"; "science" (i.e., objective knowledge); "ideology" (as "false consciousness"). Yet, it is these ideas alone that clarify the elemental truths through which theory ceases to be a gray activism of tropes, desire and affect, and becomes, instead, a red, revolutionary guide to praxis for a new society freed from exploitation and injustice. Marx's original scientific discovery was his labor theory of value. Marx's labor theory of value is an elemental truth of Orthodox Marxism that is rejected by the flexodox left as the central dogmatism of a "totalitarian" Marxism. It is only Marx's labor theory of value, however, that exposes the mystification of the wages system that disguises exploitation as a "fair exchange" between capital and labor and reveals the truth about this relation as one of exploitation. Only Orthodox Marxism explains how what the workers sell to the capitalist is not labor, a commodity like any other whose price is determined by fluctuations in supply and demand, but their labor-power—their ability to labor in a system which has systematically "freed" them from the means of production so they are forced to work or starve—whose value is determined by the amount of time socially necessary to reproduce it daily. The value of labor-power is equivalent to the value of wages workers consume daily in the form of commodities that keep them alive to be exploited tomorrow. Given the technical composition of production today this amount of time is a slight fraction of the workday the majority of which workers spend producing surplus-value over and above their needs. The surplus-value is what is pocketed by the capitalists in the form of profit when the commodities are sold. Class is the antagonistic division thus established between the exploited and their exploiters. Without Marx's labor theory of value one could only contest the after effects of this outright theft of social labor-power rather than its cause lying in the private ownership of production. The flexodox rejection of the labor theory of value as the "dogmatic" core of a totalitarian Marxism therefore is a not so subtle rejection of the principled defense of the (scientific) knowledge workers need for their emancipation from exploitation because only the labor theory of value exposes the opportunism of knowledges (ideology) that occult this exploitation. Without the labor theory of value socialism would only be a moral dogma that appeals to the sentiments of "fairness" and "equality" for a "just" distribution of the social wealth that does the work of capital by naturalizing the exploitation of labor under capitalism giving it an acceptable "human face."

#### Ethics DA – We have ethical obligation to repudiate capitalism – this means any risk a link is a reason to reject the permutation

Marsh 95 (James, Professor of Philosophy at Fordham University, “Critique, Action, Liberation” p. 334-335)

An example from the sphere of personal morality should make the difference clear. When a friend, relative, teacher, or minister counsels an alcoholic to confront her habit, she is not making a prediction. Indeed it may seem unlikely, given this particular person’s past history, that she will lick her habit. Nonetheless, the moral obligation to get over her habit remains. Similarly, an obligation exists to get over **our** capitalism as a social equivalent of drunkenness. If the argument of this chapter is correct, we cannot renounce such an attempt at transcendence without giving up on the ethical project or curtailing that project by confining it to the sphere of intimate, interpersonal relations**.** I am a good father or husband or lover in my private life, but i remain exploitative, cruel, and inhumane in my public, capitalistic life. Such ethical renunciation or curtailment is the death or mutilation of the human; denial of utopia is a living death. Ideologies of scientific elitism, therefore, as they function in capitalist society are correct if there is no such thing as ethical, constitutive reason operating in community**.** If such constitutive reason is possible and actual in human beings as human in community, then scientific elitism is false. Men and women acting democratically and participatively do have a capacity to understand themselves and their lives in a way that is cogent and in touch with reality. Indeed, many of the popular movements in Europe, England, and the United States in the last twenty years such as feminism, environmentalism, civil rights, and antiwar movements, often acting against the advice or opinion of experts have shown themselves to be right and effective. In the Vietnam War, for example, millions of people in the united states taking to the streets in protest proved the “best and the brightest” in the white house, pentagon, and state department wrong. The “best and the brightest” according to the standards of scientific elitism proved to be deluded. The presence of an ethical, political rationality in all of us as human invalidates scientific elitism at its core. As I am arguing it here, a fundamental link exists among dialectical phenomenology, ethical, constitutive rationality, and democracy. Philosophy and ethics, properly understood, are antielitist. To think in a utopian manner, then, about community and socialism is to free ourselves from the excessive hold that science and technology exert over our minds and imaginations. We begin to see that science and technology and expertise, even though they are legitimate within their proper domains, do not exhaust or monopolize the definition of reason and other forms of reason and knowledge that are more informative, profound, and fundamental, indeed, compared to certain expressions of art or ethics or philosophy or religion, science and technology are relatively superficial**.** What revelatory power does a scientific equation have compared to Hamlet’s “to be or not to be” speech? What does an empirical of human populations show me about human life compared to the insight of Marx’s capital? What can a factual study of war show about its horrors compared to Picasso’s Guernica? To the extend, therefore, that science and technology dominate in the twentieth century as not only the highest forms of reason by the only forms of reason, they shove other, more profound, more reflective, more fundamental forms of reason to the side and twentieth-century industrial society emerges as an inverted, topsy-turvy, absurd world. What seems normal, factural, rational, and sane in such a world is in fact abnormal, apparent, irrational, and absurd. We begin to suspect and see that science and technology appear as the highest and only forms of reason because capitalism has appropriated science and technology for its own ends as productive force and ideology. In science and technology capitalism has found the forms of rationality most appropriate for itself, perfectly manifesting it, mirroring it, and justifying it. In such an absurd, inverted topsy-turvy world, fidelity to the life of reason demands critique, resistance, and revolutionary transcendence. One has to pierce the veil of such a world, see through it as absurd rather than accepting it as normal and sane. The prevailing rationality is profoundly irrational.

### Links

#### The nuclear energy industry is driven by capitalism – extend 1NC Tatzuro – nuclear energy will always cause exploitation because capitalism drives it to prioritize the profit motive above all else.

#### The new nuclear power plants they build in rich neighborhoods will be built unsafely, because it’s cheaper. Capitalism also ignores byproducts of energy production like the new nuclear waste they create – as seen in the Yucca blowup turns on case – all because it only focuses on short term profit motive at the expense of the environment.

#### Nuclear power fails because it is driven by capitalist profit motives at the expense of the working class who suffer the environmental consequences – ony the alternative can ensure a clean environment

Socialist Labor Party of America 79 (“The Socialist Alternative to Nuclear Catastrophe” http://www.slp.org/res\_state\_htm/nuc\_catas79.html)

In fact, while calling for additional federal regulations and increased government policing of nuclear power plants, capitalist politicians and bureaucrats have already demonstrated that even a near-catastrophe like the one that occurred near Harrisburg will have no substantive impact on the manner in which the nuclear industry does business. Dozens of nuclear plants, a number of them virtual “clones” of the Three Mile Island installation, continue to operate in callous disregard for the public safety. And the Carter administration has already announced that it will push ahead with legislation to streamline the procedure to license new nuclear facilities. The recent nuclear accident again supports the Socialist Labor Party’s position that nothing less than the abolition of the profit system and the socialist reconstruction of society will make it possible for the American people to restore and maintain a safe and healthful environment. Only with the elimination of private ownership in the means of production and the establishment of a socialist industrial democracy will the working-class majority of Americans be able to harness technology while giving due consideration to its health, safety and environmental implications. The call for a socialist solution to the nuclear energy problem has nothing in common with calls for the nationalization of the nuclear industry. Such a step would neither alter the profit motivations which dictate how nuclear technology is implemented nor take control of such technology out of the hands of a small minority and place it under the collective control of the working class. Indeed, the fact that the current nuclear peril has been overseen by government agencies for years provides ample proof that a resolution of the problem is not to be found in government ownership by the capitalist state.

#### Their use of incentives for nuclear power as a way to challenge siting discrimination will be coopted by capitalism

#### 1. Companies might take advantage of the incentive to build fancy high next generation plants that wow and impress the wealthy people living near them, generating support for nuclear power so that the industry can continue to build run down, cheap plants in poor neighborhoods.

#### 2. Their aff will be further coopted because the new nuclear power they build will be used to drive the capitalist engine of growth that allows new situations to arrise where discrimination occurs – for example driving profits that further the rich/poor gap.

#### Energy production drives capitalism – it enables the capitalist cycle of growth and exploitation of the working class

ICC 11 (International Communist Current, “Nuclear energy, capitalism and communism” August 16th, World Revolution no.347, September 2011, http://en.internationalism.org/wr/347/nuclear#\_ftnref30)

The increasing use of energy has been a feature of industrialisation around the world. It expresses not only the increase in scale of production and the impact of rising population, but also the development of productivity with the increase in the quantity of the means of production, including energy, that each worker is able to set in motion. This trend has continued today: between 1973 and 2008 total energy consumption increased by 80%.[18] The revolution in the form and quantity of energy available to humanity underpinned the industrial revolution and opened the door from the realm of want to that of plenty. But this revolution was driven by the development of capitalism whose purpose is not the satisfaction of human needs but the increase of capital based on the appropriation of surplus value produced by an exploited working class. Energy is used to drive the development of productivity but it is also a cost of production. It is part of the constant capital alongside raw materials, machines and factories and, as such, tends to increase in relation to the variable capital that is the source of capitalism’s profits. It is this that dictates capitalism’s attitude to energy. Capitalism has no regard for the use of energy, for the destruction of finite resources, other than as a cost of production. Increased productivity tends to require increased energy, so the capitalists (other than those in the oil industry) are driven to try and reduce the cost of this energy. On the one hand this results in the profligate use of energy for irrational ends, such as transporting similar commodities back and forth across the world and the ceaseless multiplication of commodities that meet no real human need but serve only as a means to extract and realise surplus value. On the other, it leads to the denial of access to energy and to the products of energy for millions of humans who lack the money to be of interest to the capitalists. This is illustrated in Nigeria where Shell pumps out billions of dollars worth of oil while the local people go without or risk their lives by trying to illegally tap the oil from the pipeline. The price is also paid by those working in the energy industries in lives lost and bodies maimed or poisoned and by the environment and all that lives in it, from the polluted, toxic waters of the Thames that characterised 19th century London to the warming of the globe that threatens the future of humanity today.

#### Their methodology also links to capitalism –

#### Environmental justice approaches ignore the historical roots of injustice in de-industrialization and class conflict

Downey 5 (Liam, University of Colorado Faculty Associate in Population Program and CU Population Center “The Unintended Significance of Race: Environmental Racial Inequality in Detroit,” Social Forces, 83, 3, 8/1/12, 971-972) CMAP

First, because researchers have been preoccupied with determining the predictive power of race and income at a single point in time, they have devoted little attention to studying the historical processes that have given rise to environmental inequality (exceptions include Krieg 1995; Oakes, Anderton, and Anderson 1996; Pastor, Sadd and Hipp 2001). Second, hypotheses about the determinants of environmental inequality have not been organized into coherent models that can be formally tested. Third, environmental justice research is not theoretically grounded. For example, although many environmental inequality researchers study manufacturing facility pollution, few, if any, discuss deindustrialization or class conflict, factors that are likely to play an important role in shaping environmental inequality. Similarly, few links have been made between environmental inequality research, the declining significance of race debate, and spatial mismatch theory, despite the fact that the debate on the declining significance of race focuses closely on the relative importance of race and income in explaining racial inequality and the fact that spatial mismatch theory hypothesizes a spatial disjuncture between manufacturing facilities and poor, urban black neighborhoods.

#### Their writer-activism model links to capitalism – the idea of opening up a discursive space to challenge siting models positions nuclear siting problems as a problem of the way we think and talk about nuclear energy. This discursive normalizes the economic system that actually underlies capitalism.

#### Intellectuals on the left have been critical in normalizing the economic structure of capitalism while criticizing the textures and contours of the system – they preclude the fundamental reality that all social dynamics rely on the mode of production and not the other way around.

Ebert and Zavarzadeh 8(Teresa L., English, State University of New York, Albany, Mas’ud, prolific writer and expert on class ideology, “Class in Culture”, p. 36-38)

Thecultural **activism of capital against labor**, however, **was not limited to conservative thinkers. It also** energetically **recruited Left intellectuals and "socialists of the** heart." The defense of free enterprise from the Left has always been of great cultural value to capitalism. **When Left intellectuals defend the market directly-in the guise, for example, of "market socialism"** *(Market Socialism: The Debate among Socialists,* ed. Oilman; *Why Market Socialism? Voices from Dissent,* ed. Roosevelt and Belkin)--**or denounce the enemies of capital as totalitarian, as violators of human rights, and for repressing the play of cultural meanings and thus singularity and heterogeneity** (e.g., Sidney **Hook**, Emesto **Laclau**, Jean-Francois **Lyotard**, Jacques **Derrida**), **their discourses seem more authoritative and sound more credible coming from the supposed critics of capital than do the discourses of conservative authors.** To put it precisely: **the Left has been valuable to capitalism because it has played a double role in legitimating capitalism. It has criticized capitalism as a culture, but has normalized it as an economic system** (e.g., Deleuze and Guat-tari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia;* Duncombe, ed., *Cultural Resistance Reader;* Kraus and Lotringer, eds., *Hatred of Capitalism).* **It** has **complained about capitalism's** so-called corporate **culture**, **but** has **normalized it as a system of wage-labor that** is **grounded on exchange-relations and produces the corporate culture**. **The normalization of capitalism by the Left takes many forms**, **but** all **involve the justification of exploitation, which the Left represents as redemptive. They are** all **versions**-with various degrees of conceptual complexity- -**of** Nicholas D. **Kristof's argument in** his "In **Praise of the Maligned Sweatshop**." **He writes that** the sweatshops in Africa set up by capitalists of the North are in fact "opportunities" and advises that "**anyone who cares about** fighting **poverty should campaign in favor of sweatshops**." His argument is summed up by two sentences printed in boldface and foregrounded in his essay: **"What's worse than being exploited? Not being exploited**" *(The New York Times,* 6 June 2006, A-21). **What** has **made this** double **role** of postwar Left writers **so effective for capitalism is the way their** innovative **writing**, unorthodox **uses of language, and** captivating **arguments have generated** intellectual **excitement**. Jean-Paul **Sartre**, Theodor **Adorno,** Jean-Francais **Lyotard**, Jacques **Derrida**, Judith **Butler**, Jean **Baudrillard**, Jacques **Lacan**, Michel **Foucault**, Gilles **Deleuze**, Giorgio **Agamben**, Slavoj **Zizek**, **and** Stuart **Hall**, to name the most familiar authors, **have each used** quite **different**, **but** still **intellectually intriguing idioms**, **to de-historicize capitalism**. In highly subtle and nuanced arguments, **they have translated capitalism's Authoritarian economic practices**-which quietly force workers to concede to the exploitation of their labor-**into cultural values of free choice and self-sovereignty** (at the same time that they question traditional subjectivity). **Their most effective contributions to capitalism and its economic institutions have been to represent capitalism as a discursive system of meanings and** thus **divert attention away from its economic violence to its semantic transgressions-its homogenizing of meanings** in, for example, popular culture **or its erasure of difference** in cultural lifestyles. **They** have **criticized capitalism**, in other words, **for its** cultural **destruction of human imagination, but** at the same time, they **have condoned its logic of exploitation by dismantling** almost all **the conceptual apparatuses and analytics that offer a materialist understanding of capitalism as an economic system**. More specifically, **they have discredited any efforts to place class at the center of understanding and to grasp the extent and violence of labor practices**. They have done so, in the name of the "new" and with an ecstatic joy bordering on religious zeal (Ronell, *The Telephone Book;* Strangelove, *The Empire of Mind: Digital Piracy and the Anti-Capitalist Movement;* Gibson-Graham, *A Postcapitatist Politics).* **Left thinkers,** for example**, have argued that "new" changes in capitalism**-**the shift**, they claim, **from production to consumption**-**have triggered "a revolution in human thought around the idea of 'culture" which**, under new conditions, **has** itself **become material, "primary and constitutive"** (Hall, "The Centrality of Culture" 220, 215), **and is no** longer secondary and **dependent on** such outside **matters as relations of production**. Consequently, Hall and **others have argued that the analytics of base/superstructure has become irrelevant to sociocultural interpretations because the "new" conditions have rendered such concepts as objectivity, cause and effect, and materialism questionable.** "**The** old **distinction**" **between "**economic **'base' and** the ideological **'superstructure**" therefore **can no longer be sustained because the new culture is** what Fredric Jameson calls **"mediatic**" *(Postmodernism* 68). According to Hall, "media both form a critical part of the material infrastructure ... and are the principal means by which ideas and images are circulated" (Hall 209) . . . The logic of Hall's argument is obtained by treating the "material" as materialist. Media, however, are "material" only in a very trivial sense, they have a body of matter, and are a material vehicle (as a "medium"), but **media are not "materialist**" because, as we argue in our theory of materialism below, **they do not produce "value" and are not "productive." They distribute values produced at the point of production**. The un-said of Hall's claim is that **production and consumption/distribution are no longer distinguishable and more significantly, labor has itself become immaterial-**which is now a popular tenet in the cultural turn (Hardt and Negri, *Multitude).* But, even Paul Thompson, who is not without sympathy for the tum to culture, argues that **"labour is never immaterial. It is not the content of labour but its commodity form that gives 'weight' to an object or idea in a market economy,"** and, he adds, **While it is true that production has been deterritorialised** to an extent, **network firms are not a replacement for the assembly line and do not substitute horizontal for vertical forms of coordination**. Network firms are a type of extended hierarchy, based, as Harrison observes, on concentration without centralisation: 'production may be decentralised, while power finance, distribution, and control remain concentrated among the big firms' *(Lean and Mean: The Changing Landscape of Corporate Power in the Age of Flexibility,* 1994: 20). **Internal networks do not exist independently of these relations of production.** and forms of cooperation, such as teams, are set in motion and monitored by management rather than spontaneously formed. ("Foundation and Empire: A Critique of Hardt and Negri" 84) **Relations of production have shaped and will continue to shape the cultural superstructure. Changes in its phenomenology-**the textures of everyday lifestyles, whether one listens to music in a concert hall, on the radio, or through an iPod-**should not lead to postmodern** Quixotic **fantasies about the autonomy of culture from its material base** [Ebert, *Cultural Critique (with an attitude)].* As Marx writes, the Middle Ages could not live on Catholicism, nor could the ancient world on politics. On the contrary, **it is the manner in which they gained their livelihood which explains why in one case politics, in the other case Catholicism, played the chief part** .... And then **there is** Don **Quixote who long ago paid the penalty for wrongly imagining that knight errantry was compatible with all economic forms of society**. (Marx, *Capital* l, 176).

### A2: Market forces don’t explain

#### Capitalism does explain the siting of nuclear power plants:

#### 1. Upper socioeconomic neighborhoods have more resources to fund political opposition and NIMBYism – that’s a claim backed by their 1AC Foster evidence.

#### 2. Poorer neighborhoods are forced to accept the greater risks of nuclear power as a direct result of their material economic position. Their lack of resources forces them to accept the plants because capitalism has rendered desperate for economic resources and because the only way they can survive is to sell their labor power. In this case, the only willing buyer of their labor power might be the nuclear industry, so they accept the power plants. This claim is supported by their 1AC Lazarus evidence.

#### 3. Land is more expensive in wealthier neighborhoods, which dictates siting – this is a direct product of capitalist economics – that’s their 1AC Foster evidence.

#### Race has nothing to do with brownfield siting; rather, income is correlated with living in environmentally damaged areas

Downey 5 (Liam, University of Colorado Faculty Associate in Population Program and CU Population Center “The Unintended Significance of Race: Environmental Racial Inequality in Detroit,” Social Forces, 83, 3, 8/1/12, 971-972) CMAP

For example, several environmental inequality studies have found environmental hazards to be distributed equitably according to race in areas where they are distributed inequitably according to income, despite the fact that minorities generally earn significantly less than whites (Anderton et al. 1994a; Oakes, Anderton, and Anderson 1996; Yandle and Burton 1996). But if income is negatively associated with environmental hazard presence and minorities earn less than whites, then minority presence should be positively associated with hazard presence. That this is not always the case suggests that racial status sometimes decreases minority representation in environmentally hazardous neighborhoods below what we would expect based on income alone. This raises interesting and important theoretical questions. Are there situations in which racial status separates minorities from socially undesirable goods such as pollution? More specifically, can racism in one institutional arena (for example, the housing market) weaken racial inequality in another arena (the environment)?¶ In order to answer these questions, I use 1970, 1980, and 1990 data to track the flow of social groups and polluting manufacturing facilities through the Detroit metropolitan area, a region where environmental racial inequality is relatively weak despite the fact that black/white income inequality and income-based environmental inequality are relatively strong. I use census and manufacturing facility data to test four models of environmental inequality that make predictions about the determinants of manufacturing facility siting decisions and the impact that manufacturing facility presence has on neighborhood demographics. Taken collectively, the models ask whether the distribution of blacks and whites around polluting manufacturing facilities is the result of black/white income inequality, racist siting practices, or the biased operation of the housing market.¶ As we shall see, the distribution of blacks and whites around Detroit's polluting manufacturing facilities is not the result of black/white income inequality or racist siting practices. Instead, it is largely the product of residential segregation which, paradoxically, has reduced black proximity to manufacturing facility pollution. Thus, it turns out that racial status and racism play an important role in shaping environmental inequality in the Detroit metropolitan area, but they operate indirectly through the housing market, and their effect has been to separate blacks from manufacturing facility pollution. [End Page 972]

#### Capitalism is the root cause of racism

McLaren and Torres 99 (Peter Mclaren, professor of education at U of California, and Rudolfo Torres, Professor of Planning, Policy, and Design, Chicano/Latino Studies, and Political Science, “Racism and Multicultural Education: Rethinking ‘Race’ and ‘Whiteness’ in Late Capitalism”, Chapter 2 of “Critical Multiculturalism: Rethinking Multicultural and Antiracist Education”, edited by Stephen May, p.49-50, Questia)

According to Alex Callinicos (1993), racial differences are invented. Racism occurs when the characteristics which justify discrimination are held to be inherent in the oppressed group. This form of oppression is peculiar to capitalist societies; it arises in the circumstances surrounding industrial capitalism and the attempt to acquire a large labour force. Callinicos points out three main conditions for the existence of racism as outlined by Marx: economic competition between workers; the appeal of racist ideology to white workers; and efforts of the capitalist class to establish and maintain racial divisions among workers. Capital's constantly changing demands for different kinds of labour can only be met through immigration. Callinicos remarks that 'racism offers for workers of the oppressing “race” the imaginary compensation for the exploitation they suffer of belonging to the “ruling nation”' (1993, p. 39). Callinicos notes the way in which Marx grasped how 'racial' divisions between 'native' and 'immigrant' workers could weaken the working-class. United States' politicians like Pat Buchanan, Jesse Helms and Pete Wilson, to name but a few, take advantage of this division which the capitalist class understands and manipulates only too well-using racism effectively to divide the working-class. At this point you might be asking yourselves: Doesn't racism pre-date capitalism? Here we agree with Callinicos that the heterophobia associated with precapitalist societies was not the same as modern racism. Pre-capitalist slave and feudal societies of classical Greece and Rome did not rely on racism to justify the use of slaves. The Greeks and Romans did not have theories of white superiority. If they did, that must have been unsettling news to Septimus Severus, Roman Emperor from Ad 193 to 211, who was, many historians claim, a black man. Racism emerged during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries from a key development of capitalism-colonial plantations in the New World where slave labour stolen from Africa was used to produce tobacco, sugar, and cotton for the global consumer market (Callinicos, 1993). Callinicos cites Eric Williams who remarks: 'Slavery was not born of racism: rather, racism was the consequence of slavery' (cited in Callinicos, 1993, p. 24). In effect, racism emerged as the ideology of the plantocracy. It began with the class of sugar-planters and slave merchants that dominated England's Caribbean colonies. Racism developed out of the 'systemic slavery' of the New World. The 'natural inferiority' of Africans was a way that Whites justified enslaving them. According to Callinicos: Racism offers white workers the comfort of believing themselves part of the dominant group; it also provides, in times of crisis, a ready-made scapegoat, in the shape of the oppressed group. Racism thus gives white workers a particular identity, and one which unites them with white capitalists. We have here, then, a case of the kind of 'imagined community' discussed by Benedict Anderson in his influential analysis of nationalism. (1993, p. 38) In short, to abolish racism in any substantive sense, we need to abolish global capitalism.

### A2: Gibson-Graham

#### Their strategy can only make capitalism more user-friendly – they epistemologically rule out the possibility of revolutionary praxis.

Poitevin 1 (René Francisco, Assistant Professor, NYU. “The end of anti-capitalism as we knew it: Reflections on postmodern Marxism”, Socialist Review. <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3952/is_200101/ai_n8932891/pg_10/?tag=content;col1>)

It is also interesting that JK Gibson-Graham maintain that challenging their analysis of The Full Monty, or not endorsing the politics of the film, “is inherently conservative and capitalocentric.”48 I disagree strongly. The politics advocated by J.K. Gibson-Graham through their reading of The Full Monty is nothing but liberal politics with post-structuralist delusions of grandeur. It is one thing to say that we are at a political conjuncture in which the thing to do is to work hard for reform, not “revolution.” But it is another thing to argue that revolutionary practice cannot happen on epistemological grounds, and that all we can do is make capitalism as user friendly as possible while obscuring and co-opting the Marxist tradition. J.K. Gibson-Graham’s reading of The Full Monty is both liberal and reactionary. What the postmodern Marxist’s reading of The Full Monty demonstrates is that in their desire to get rid of “capitalocentrism” - the alleged obsession of Marxists with seeing “capitalism” everywhere - they end up reconfiguring and consolidating capitalism back in. In their unreflective romanticizing of reform, and in their haughty contempt for revolutionary thinking and politics, J.K-.Gibson-Graham’s style of postmodern/post-Marxism delivers what boils down to good old-fashioned liberalism: a mild, state-administered “economic justice” platform centered around individual private liberties, neatly packaged in postmodern gift wrapping. The bottom line is this: When one looks closely at what postmodern/post-Marxist theory actually offers, and after it is done “representing capitalism through the lens of overdetermination,”49 all one can strategize about is how to make capitalism more “user friendly.” Gone is the project of getting rid of it. Strangely enough, postmodern/ post-Marxists do not regard these positions as a surrender of the Marxist project at all, but rather, as the exact fulfillment of that commitment.

#### Gibson and Graham would hate the plan – they hate capitalism as much as we do they simply advocate a different approach to negating it. The plan only fosters the spread of capitalism domination worldwide by eliminating state control and deregulating the market

#### In order to win Gibson and Graham they have to win a no link AND a link turn – if we win any link to the plan then they are not a rejection of capitalism and therefore can’t solve for Gibson and Graham

#### Gibson-Graham do capitalism a favor more than anything – by individualizing the struggle, you destroy any society wide resisitance

Cotter 2 (Jennifer, nqa, “War and Domestic Violence”, Red Critique, Sept/Oct, p. online)

Moreover, by generalizing Marcus' understanding of "rape prevention" to explain globalization in all of its practices, Gibson-Graham represent "resistance" to globalization on these same terms: as an autonomous act of private individuals not requiring general transformation of the social conditions of production for all. Far from offering a mode of "resistance", this actually offers a position that is highly useful to transnational capitalism, which is daily trying to dismantle any social resources committed to the economic, social, and physical well being of workers in general, and women in particular, in the international division of labor. In short, this position is consistent with the efforts of transnational capital to dismantle social resources and re-privatize them and destroy any conditions for social citizenship in order to stave off declines in the rate of profit. Gibson-Graham's privatized view of globalization and violence against women, for instance, follows the same logic as the Bush administration, which, working on behalf of transnational capital, has been working to dismantle social resources for women and reprivatize them.

### The State

#### Orienting our alternative towards the state guarantees cooption and commodification by capitalism, reinforcing domination and hierarchy.

Holloway 5 professor at Institute for Humanities and Social Sciences at the Autonomous University of Puebla John, Can We Change The World Without Taking Power?, 5 April 05,

http://www.isj.org.uk/index.php4?id=98)

I don’t know the answer. Perhaps we can change the world without taking power. Perhaps we cannot. The starting point—for all of us, I think—is uncertainty, not knowing, a common search for a way forward. Because it becomes more and more clear that capitalism is a catastrophe for humanity. A radical change in the organisation of society, that is, revolution, is more urgent than ever. And this revolution can only be world revolution if it is to be effective. But it is unlikely that world revolution can be achieved in one single blow. This means that the only way in which we can conceive of revolution is as interstitial revolution, as a revolution that takes place in the interstices of capitalism, a revolution that occupies spaces in the world while capitalism still exists. The question is how we conceive of these interstices, whether we think of them as states or in other ways.In thinking about this, we have to start from where we are, from the many rebellions and insubordinations that have brought us to Porto Alegre. The world is full of such rebellions, of people saying NO to capitalism: NO, we shall not live our lives according to the dictates of capitalism, we shall do what we consider necessary or desirable and not what capital tells us to do. Sometimes we just see capitalism as an all-encompassing system of domination and forget that such rebellions exist everywhere. At times they are so small that even those involved do not perceive them as refusals, but often they are collective projects searching for an alternative way forward and sometimes they are as big as the Lacandon Jungle or the Argentinazo of three years ago or the revolt in Bolivia just over a year ago. All of these insubordinations are characterised by a drive towards self-determination, an impulse that says, ‘No, you will not tell us what to do, we shall decide for ourselves what we must do.’ These refusals can be seen as fissures, as cracks in the system of capitalist domination. Capitalism is not (in the first place) an economic system, but a system of command. Capitalists, through money, command us, telling us what to do. To refuse to obey is to break the command of capital. The question for us, then, is how do we multiply and expand these refusals, these cracks in the texture of domination?There are two ways of thinking about this. The first says that these movements, these many insubordinations, lack maturity and effectiveness unless they are focused, unless they are channelled towards a goal. For them to be effective, they must be channelled towards the conquest of state power—either through elections or through the overthrowing of the existing state and the establishment of a new, revolutionary state. The organisational form for channelling all these insubordinations towards that aim is the party. The question of taking state power is not so much a question of future intentions as of present organisation. How should we organise ourselves in the present? Should we join a party, an organisational form that focuses our discontent on the winning of state power? Or should we organise in some other way?The second way of thinking about the expansion and multiplication of insubordinations is to say, ‘No, they should not be all harnessed together in the form of a party, they should flourish freely, go whatever way the struggle takes them.’ This does not mean that there should be no coordination, but it should be a much looser coordination. Above all, the principal point of reference is not the state but the society that we want to create. The principal argument against the first conception is that it leads us in the wrong direction. The state is not a thing, it is not a neutral object: it is a form of social relations, a form of organisation, a way of doing things which has been developed over several centuries for the purpose of maintaining or developing the rule of capital. If we focus our struggles on the state, or if we take the state as our principal point of reference, we have to understand that the state pulls us in a certain direction. Above all, it seeks to impose upon us a separation of our struggles from society, to convert our struggle into a struggle on behalf of, in the name of. It separates leaders from the masses, the representatives from the represented; it draws us into a different way of talking, a different way of thinking. It pulls us into a process of reconciliation with reality, and that reality is the reality of capitalism, a form of social organisation that is based on exploitation and injustice, on killing and destruction. It also draws us into a spatial definition of how we do things, a spatial definition which makes a clear distinction between the state’s territory and the world outside, and a clear distinction between citizens and foreigners. It draws us into a spatial definition of struggle that has no hope of matching the global movement of capital. There is one key concept in the history of the state-centred left, and that concept is betrayal. Time and time again the leaders have betrayed the movement, and not necessarily because they are bad people, but just because the state as a form of organisation separates the leaders from the movement and draws them into a process of reconciliation with capital. Betrayal is already given in the state as an organisational form. Can we resist this? Yes, of course we can, and it is something that happens all the time. We can refuse to let the state identify leaders or permanent representatives of the movement, we can refuse to let delegates negotiate in secret with the representatives of the state. But this means understanding that our forms of organisation are very different from those of the state, that there is no symmetry between them. The state is an organisation on behalf of, what we want is the organisation of self-determination, a form of organisation that allows us to articulate what we want, what we decide, what we consider necessary or desirable. What we want, in other words, is a form of organisation that does not have the state as its principal point of reference. The argument against taking the state as the principal point of reference is clear, but what of the other concept? The state-oriented argument can be seen as a pivoted conception of the development of struggle. Struggle is conceived as having a central pivot, the taking of state power. First we concentrate all our efforts on winning the state, we organise for that, then, once we have achieved that, we can think of other forms of organisation, we can think of revolutionising society. First we move in one direction, in order to be able to move in another: the problem is that the dynamic acquired during the first phase is difficult or impossible to dismantle in the second phase. The other concept focuses directly on the sort of society we want to create, without passing through the state. There is no pivot: organisation is directly prefigurative, directly linked to the social relations we want to create. Where the first concept sees the radical transformation of society as taking place after the seizure of power, the second insists that it must begin now. Revolution not when the time is right but revolution here and now.